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1 Introduction
Decision problems may be of two types, depending on the nature of their status quo.
The first type includes problems where the status quo enters as an option that is
qualitatively similar to all others. A consumer would be facing a decision problem
of this type if he was endowed with insurance policy A and was confronted with the
choice between keeping A or giving it up for one of policies B or C. The second type
includes decision problems where the status quo is not of the same nature as the other
feasible alternatives. In a modification of the previous example, the consumer would
be facing a problem of this type if he was uninsured and policies A, B and C were
available to him. Maintaining the status quo in problems of the former type translates
into choosing a physical alternative. By contrast, status quo maintenance in problems
of the latter type translates into choosing no physical alternative. In this paper, the
former type of problems will be referred to as being associated with a specific status
quo and the latter as ones with a non-specific status quo.
Choice deferral refers to the observation that, when faced with decision problems
with a non-specific status quo, people sometimes choose none of the options avail-
able to them, or equivalently choose their non-specific status quo. Some reasons for
such behaviour include undesirability of the feasible alternatives, difficulties in mak-
ing comparisons and finding a dominant option that are caused by decision conflict,
and choice overload (Zakay, 1984; Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Greenleaf and Lehmann,
1995; Dhar, 1997; Luce, 1998; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Dhar and Simonson, 2003).
Importantly, when decision conflict is the reason why the agent defers, it is understood
that he does so despite the fact that all alternatives are desirable in the sense that
each of them would be chosen had it been the only feasible option. On the other hand,
status quo bias or default bias refers to the observation that, when faced with deci-
sion problems with a specific status quo, individuals more commonly choose a feasible
option when this is actually their status quo than when it is not (Knetsch and Sin-
den, 1984; Knetsch, 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Behaviour that exhibits
choice deferral or status quo bias is sometimes called avoidant behaviour (Anderson,
2003).
This paper uses the expanded choice domain introduced in Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005) and extends the model of partially dominant choice proposed in Gerasimou
(2015) in the direction of allowing for both types of avoidant behavior. This model is
the first in the literature to feature a decision maker whose choices are guided by an
acyclic and incomplete preference relation that is independent of the decision problem’s
type and menu of feasible alternatives. The way this preference relation is used by the
agent is similar across the two types of decision problems. Specifically, in problems
with a non-specific status quo, the decision maker chooses an option if and only if
it dominates (i.e. is preferred to) some feasible alternative and is not dominated by
any such alternative. The agent defers choice when and only when such a feasible
option cannot be found. In problems with a specific status quo, on the other hand, he
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chooses an option other than the status quo if and only if the option is undominated
and dominates the status quo, while the latter is chosen if the above is not the case for
any alternative.
The model explains choice deferral that is due to incomparability/decision conflict.
Moreover, in contrast to existing models, it also formalizes directly, by means of a
single preference relation, the explanation of status quo bias that is based on preference
incompleteness (Bewley, 2002; Mandler, 2004; Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005). As such, it
relies on neither the use of multi-functions (Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005) nor on multiple,
reference-dependent preference relations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Bleichrodt,
2007; Apesteguia and Ballester, 2009). In addition, the partial dominance structure of
the model allows for a simple explanation of findings reported in Dhar and Simonson
(2003) suggesting a strengthening of the attraction effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto,
1982) and a weakening of the compromise effect (Simonson, 1989) when deferral is
permissible. Finally, this model appears to be the first in the literature to make a
clear theoretical distinction between choice deferral and status quo bias, and also to
suggest a theoretical connection between the potential drivers of the attraction effect
and of status quo bias or avoidant behavior more generally.
The next section introduces the model, which is referred to as the extended partial
dominance procedure. The section following it introduces and discusses the axioms
that characterize this choice procedure and identifies the way in which utility maxi-
mization is included as a special case by the model whenever preferences are complete.
Section 4 discusses the model’s predictions in relation to the experimental evidence,
provides a review of the related literature and concludes with some methodological
remarks about two approaches in the modelling of choice deferral.
2 Extended Partial Dominance
Let X be a finite set of alternatives andM the collection of all subsets of X. Elements
ofM are menus. Almost exactly as in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), the set of decision
problems S ⊂M×M is defined as the set of all pairs (A,B), where A ∈M, A 6= ∅,
and either B = ∅ or B = {s} for some s ∈ A. Thus, S is divided into pairs of
the type (A, ∅) and (A, {s}), where s ∈ A. To be consistent with the notation in
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), (A, ) will be written instead of (A, ∅), and (A, s) instead
of (A, {s}).1 Consistent with the terminology that was introduced above, a pair (A, )
will be thought of as a decision problem with a non-specific status quo, and a pair
(A, s) is a decision problem with a specific status quo.2 A generic decision problem
(i.e. with or without a specific status quo) will be denoted by (A, p).
A choice correspondence is a mapping C : S  X that satisfies C(A, p) ⊆ A for all
1The object  is defined as something not belonging to X in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). This minor difference in
the two definitions is unimportant mathematically.
2Other interpretations have been adopted in the literature. For instance, Masatlioglu and Ok (2015) call (A, ) as
a problem without a status quo and (A, s) as a problem with a status quo.
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(A, p) ∈ S. Imposing nonempty-valuedness of C for all decision problems of the second
type is obviously necessary for ensuring conceptual relevance and internal consistency.
Therefore, it will be assumed that, for all (A, s) ∈ S,
C(A, s) 6= ∅
However, in order to capture the phenomenon of choice deferral, C will generally be
allowed to be empty-valued in problems with an irrelevant status quo. That is, there
may exist (A, ) ∈ S such that
C(A, ) = ∅.
General nonempty-valuedness is introduced as an explicit axiom later and will be used
to demonstrate how the model developed below includes rational choice as a special
case. This approach to modelling deferral is discussed in section 4.3.
The behavioral model of choice that is proposed and analyzed in this paper is
introduced next.
Definition 1
A choice correspondence C : S → X is generated by an extended partial domi-
nance (EPD) procedure if there exists a unique acyclic relation  on X such that,
for all (A, ), (A, s) ∈ S,
C(A, ) 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ C(A, ) =

z  x for all z ∈ A
x ∈ A : and
x  y for some y ∈ A
 (1a)
C(A, s) 6= s ⇐⇒ C(A, s) =

z  x for all z ∈ A
x ∈ A : and
x  s
 (1b)
The former part of the EPD model, (1a), implies3 that, for all (A, ) ∈ S,
C(A, ) = ∅ ⇐⇒ x  y and y  x for all x, y ∈ A. (2)
Therefore, (1a) and (2) jointly dictate behavior in decision problems with a non-specific
status quo. In particular, under the EPD model the agent defers choice at those and
only those menus in which he is unable to make a preference comparison between
any two alternatives, as captured in (2). When such a comparison can be made,
however, the agent chooses among those feasible alternatives that are not dominated
by anything in the menu and also dominate something, as captured in (1a). The
difference between this part of the EPD model and the model of partially dominant
choice proposed in Gerasimou (2015) is that, instead of considering everything to be
3This is so because the relation  is acyclic. Thus, if (1a) is not satisfied in (A, ), it must be because x  y for all
x, y ∈ A.
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choosable when faced with a decision problem with a non-specific status quo in which
no preference comparison can be made, the agent here always defers choice from such
a menu.
Moreover, the second part of this model, (1b) implies that for all (A, s) ∈ S
C(A, s) = s ⇐⇒ z  s for all z ∈ A. (3)
Thus, (1b) and (3) jointly characterize behavior in problems with a specific status
quo. This part of the model suggests that, in decision problems of this kind, the agent
chooses something other than the status quo if and only if he can find an undominated
feasible option that is preferred to it.
The link between (1a) and (1b) in the EPD model is noteworthy as it suggests that
the agent’s decision to abandon the status quo, as captured by (1b), follows a special
application of the partial dominance choice procedure that is described in (1a). In
particular, for a feasible alternative other than the status quo to be choosable it must
be universally undominated on the one hand and partially dominant on the other,
but the latter must happen not with respect to some arbitrary feasible alternative,
but in relation to the status quo option instead. Thus, the model features a reference-
dependent, special application of the partial dominance choice procedure when it comes
to the decision of giving up the status quo, and reveals a surprising connection between
the potential drivers of the two phenomena. The descriptive relevance and limitations
of the model are discussed in section 4.1 below.
Through the discussion of the experimental findings with which it is compatible it
will become clear that the EPD model is one that predicts context-dependent choices.
Importantly, however, it is not a model of context-dependent preferences. The reader
is referred to Kriesler and Nitzan (2008) for arguments and evidence suggesting that
context-dependent choice procedures with context-independent preferences are empir-
ically relevant.
3 The Axioms
This section presents the axioms that characterize the EPD model, and establishes a
formal axiomatic link between this model and utility maximization.
A1: Bounded Status Quo Bias (BSQB)
For all x, s ∈ X, if x ∈ C(A, s) and x 6= s, then x ∈ C(A, ); and if C({x, s}, ) = x,
then C({x, s}, s) = x.
According to the first part of A1, whenever the agent is faced with a decision problem
with a specific status quo and considers an alternative other than the status quo to
be choosable, he also chooses that alternative when faced with the same menu and
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the status quo is non-specific. Indeed, in view of the evidence for status quo bias, one
might expect the presence of a status quo to make it more difficult for him to declare
choosable some other feasible option. Once this is the case, however, one would also
expect the choosability of such an option to be maintained (if not increased) in the
absence of the potentially “gravitating” forces that a status quo option may exercise
on him.
Before discussing the second part of the BSQB axiom it is worth noting that one
natural interpretation of the statement C({x, s}, ) = x is that the agent would al-
most always choose x and reject s when faced with the decision problem ({x, s}, ).
This interpretation is to be contrasted with that corresponding to the statement
C({x, s}, ) = {x, s}, in which case s would also be considered choosable. More-
over, together with the absence of an alternative with the status quo property, the
fact that the menu involved in this problem is a binary one makes it natural to inter-
pret C({x, s}, ) = x as suggestive of a strict preference of the individual for x over
s. What A2 states then is that if he thinks s is strictly inferior to x, he continues to
think that also when s is the status quo.
A question that arises naturally is whether this restriction invalidates attempts
to model experimental evidence suggesting that people are status quo biased. It is
often the case that the bias is observed when choice is made from menus where no
alternative is objectively superior to the alternative that subsequently becomes the
status quo (e.g. mugs vs candy bars in Knetsch, 1989). In the case of a binary such
menu, the observed behavior is explainable by letting C({x, s}, ) = {x, s}. The axiom
allows for this choice and C({x, s}, s) = s, a combination that indeed corresponds to
status-quo biased behaviour. Seen in this way, the axiom can be thought of as ruling
out potentially extremely strong status quo biases that are capable of overturning
strict preference, but is absolutely permissive of such biases when the two alternatives
in question are possibly indifferent or incomparable. Therefore, this axiom places an
upper bound on the effect that status quo bias can have on the consumer’s choices.
A comparison is in order between BSQB and the Weak Axiom of Status Quo Bias
(WASQB) in Masatlioglu and Ok (2015). The latter states that, for all x, y ∈ X,
y ∈ C({x, y}, x) implies y ∈ C({x, y}, ) and y ∈ C({x, y}, ) implies y ∈ C({x, y}, y).
Clearly, the former part of BSQB implies the corresponding part of WASQB, while
the second parts of the two axioms are logically distinct. Yet, it is not difficult to see
that the EPD model also satisfies the second part of the WASQB axiom, and that the
main model in Masatlioglu and Ok (2015) (discussed in section 4.2) is consistent with
the first part of BSQB. However, the Masatlioglu-Ok model does not generally satisfy
the second restriction of the BSQB axiom.
A2: a-WARP
For all x, y ∈ X and A ∈M, if C({x, y}, p) = x, p 6= x and y ∈ C(A, p), then x 6∈ A.
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A2 is a minimal requirement of choice consistency across decision problems with a
non-specific status quo and across problems with a common specific status quo. If the
statement C({x, y}, p) = x, x 6= p, is interpreted as being suggestive of a strict prefer-
ence for x over y, as argued earlier, then the axiom’s requirement that y be rejected
whenever x is feasible and p is the status quo is in line with rationality in choice, which
requires that no dominated option be chosen. Obviously, the axiom’s restrictions do
not necessarily apply across decision problems with different status quos. The axiom
is named a-WARP because it is a straightforward extension of the axiom under this
name that is used in Gerasimou (2015). It obviously relaxes WARP by requiring no
weak choice reversals between x and y following choice of one over the other in a bi-
nary menu, holding the status quo fixed. As such, it is weaker than the WARP version
employed in Masatlioglu and Ok (2015) which does impose this requirement across all
problems with the same status quo.
A3: Choice Implies Rejection (CIR)
For all (A, p) ∈ S, if |A| > 1, then C(A, p) ⊂ A.
A3 requires that, irrespective of the type of decision problem he is faced with, the
agent never finds himself in a situation where he might choose any of the feasible
alternatives. This axiom is implied by single-valuedness of the choice correspondence
which is commonly employed in the literature, but obviously does not imply it.
A4: Restricted Expansion (RE)
For all A1, . . . , Ak ∈ M and x ∈ X, if x = C(A1, ), |A1| > 1, and for i 6= 1 either
x ∈ C(Ai, ) or C(A′i, ) = ∅ for all A′i ⊆ Ai with x ∈ A′i, then x ∈ C(
⋃k
i=1Ai, ).
Despite its slightly complicated statement, the behavioural restrictions of A4 are both
simple and intuitive. Consider an alternative x that is uniquely choosable in a deci-
sion problem with a non-specific status quo. If x is also choosable (not necessarily
uniquely) in each member of a given collection of decision problems of the same type,
then it will also be choosable when the status quo continues to be non-specific and
the problem includes all alternatives that were feasible in the individual decision prob-
lems. This restriction is essentially identical to that imposed by Weak Property γ in
Gerasimou (2015).4 However, A4 further states that even if x is not choosable in any
other decision problem in that collection, as long as nothing is chosen in these as well
as in all smaller problems where it is feasible, x will again be choosable in the larger
decision problem. An intuition for the latter restriction is that if nothing is chosen
over x in these and in all smaller menus, then there is no evidence that x is inferior
to any of the alternatives in these menus. This non-inferiority, together with x being
uniquely best in at least one of these menus, makes it choosable in the larger decision
problem.
4Property γ is also commonly referred to as “Expansion” in the literature.
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A5: Partial b-WARP
For all x ∈ X and A ∈M, if x ∈ C(A, ) and |A| > 1, then C({x, y}, ) = x for some
y ∈ A \ C(A, ).
This axiom is a restatement (under the notation of this paper) of the axiom with the
same name that was introduced in Gerasimou (2015). It states that choice of x in a
decision problem with a non-specific status quo implies pairwise dominance of x over
some y that was rejected in the original problem. It is implied by WARP and hence
has normative appeal. However, in a world where deferral is permissible one would
also expect its descriptive relevance to increase. Intuitively, an agent whose inaction is
associated with choice deferral and who escapes inaction only if he can find a suitable
reason to do so, may well find such a reason in instances of pairwise dominance.
Proposition 1
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C : S  X:
(a) C satisfies A1–A5.
(b) C is generated by an Extended Partial Dominance procedure.
The proof appears in Appendix A and the logical independence of the five axioms
is established in Appendix B. A sketch of the proof that the axioms are sufficient for
C to be generated by an EPD procedure is as follows. First, the preference relation
 is defined by x  y if C({x, y}, ). The restricted nonempty-valuedness of C in
problems of the type (A, s) ∈ S, together with A1 and A2 establish its acyclicity and
its applicability in both types of problems. It is then shown that A2, A4 and A5 imply
(1a) and A1–A3 imply (1b).
The connection between the EPD model and rational choice is explored next.
Clearly, the latter kind of behavior requires that choices are always made in all de-
cision problems of both types. Therefore, the following axiom must clearly be satisfied.
A0: Decisiveness
For all (A, ) ∈ S, C(A, ) 6= ∅.
Since C was taken to satisfy C(A, s) 6= ∅ by construction for all problems with a
specific status quo, the above axiom adds to this restriction by ensuring that C is
nonempty-valued also in problems with a non-specific status quo. This obviously rules
out behavioral indecisiveness and deferral.
Proposition 2
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C : S  X:
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(a) C satisfies A0–A3.
(b) There exists a unique strict linear order  on X such that, for all (A, p) ∈ S
C(A, p) = {x ∈ A : y  x for all y ∈ A}. (4)
This result clarifies that behavior which conforms with the EPD model is not in-
herently irrational, as it includes rational choice (with no indifference ties) as a special
case whenever preferences are complete (or, equivalently, whenever the agent is forced
to choose at all decision problems). The intuition is clear: When preferences are
complete, the partial dominance requirement that applies to both types of decision
problems becomes a requirement of total dominance, which is the hallmark of utility
maximization. Here, axioms A4 and A5 are implied by the remaining ones once A0 is
also assumed and are therefore redundant.
4 Discussion
4.1 The Model’s Predictions and the Experimental Evidence
The EPD model explains very simply, by means of (2), the experimental evidence
reported in Tversky and Shafir (1992); Luce (1998); Dhar (1997); Dhar and Simonson
(2003), among others, which suggest that, when not forced to choose, people frequently
defer/avoid choice in decision problems with a non-specific status quo in which they are
unable to make preference comparisons. This behavior may be due to the fact that
the absence of a (partially or totally) dominant option among those feasible makes
choice not as easy to justify to themselves or to others (Dhar and Simonson, 2003;
Simonson, 1989; Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky, 1993). Another possibility is aversion
to the possible regret that may be experienced if a choice is made that later turns
out to be suboptimal (Reb, 2008). It should be noted that the evidence for choice
deferral mainly comes from data derived from hypothetical questionnaires, although
such behavior was recently observed also in an incentivized lab experimental context
in Costa-Gomes, Cueva, and Gerasimou (2014). The reported deferral rate in these
studies is in the range of 20%–45%.
On the other hand, the EPD model rules out behavior of the choice-overload type
whereby decision makers defer more frequently from large menus than they do in
smaller ones, possibly because they perceive them as more complex.5 Indeed, it follows
from (1a) that if choice is deferred from a large menu (and thus, in view of (2) all
alternatives in that menu are mutually incomparable) but one extra partially dominant
alternative is added to it, then the agent will choose that option from the expanded
menu. It should be noted, however, that this prediction, although incompatible with
choice overload itself, is in the same direction as to how it has been suggested that
5Evidence for this effect was first reported in Iyengar and Lepper (2000).
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the effect may break down once a clearly superior (totally or partially) alternative
is introduced in the menu (see Scheibenhenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) and
references therein).
The attraction/asymmetric dominance/decoy effect, originally observed by Huber,
Payne, and Puto (1982), is the phenomenon whereby introducing a dominated option
to a menu of two conflict-generating alternatives increases the choice probability of
the option that dominates it. The strengthening of the attraction effect when choice is
not forced, defined as a significantly greater difference in the choice probabilities of the
asymmetrically dominant option in the deferral vs non-deferral setting, is one of the
main experimental findings in Dhar and Simonson (2003). Specifically, it was found
there that although the asymmetrically dominant option tended to be uniquely chosen
in the three-element menu, a significant fraction of subjects deferred at the two-element
menu, thus lowering the choice probabilities of both original alternatives there. When
the agent’s preferences coincide with the usual partial ordering in attribute space the
EPD model provides a deterministic explanation of this finding, as illustrated in the
left and middle figures of Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: The EPD model’s explanation of the findings in Dhar and Simonson (2003)
The second main finding in Dhar and Simonson (2003) is that when deferral is per-
missible, the magnitude of the compromise effect (defined as the increased choosability
of an alternative when it is the intermediate one in a menu that also includes two ex-
treme options) is significantly decreased. This effect occurs through the substantial
deferral rates in both the two- and three-element menus when subjects are not forced
to choose. The EPD model is compatible with deferring behavior in both menus when
it is understood that the agent is unable to compare the three alternatives in question,
as is the case for example, in the left and right figures of Fig. 1. Hence, the EPD is
compatible with this finding too.
As discussed in Dhar and Simonson (2003), the relatively high incidence of deferral
in the three-element menu that includes a compromise option probably reflects the
reduced appeal of the latter as a reason for an agent to make a choice in a conflict
situation when he is also given the opportunity to avoid choice altogether. By contrast,
the robustness and strengthening of the attraction effect in this setting suggests that
asymmetric dominance detection is a good-enough reason for the decision maker to
choose an alternative even when deferral is possible. Both these modes of reasoning are
consistent with the EPD model, which, to the author’s knowledge, is the only one that
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can explain both these findings in a simple deterministic way. For a model of random
choice that also accounts for these findings by introducing “perception priorities” and
relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property on choice probabilities,
however, the reader is referred to Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2014).
When it comes to decision problems with a specific status quo, finally, the EPD
model formalizes the idea that is implicit in Bewley (2002) and explicit in Mandler
(2004) and Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) that status quo bias may occur because prefer-
ences are generally incomplete and the decision maker chooses to maintain the status
quo option unless he can find something preferred to it, in which case he abandons it
for one of these superior alternatives. In view of incompleteness, finding such a supe-
rior alternative is often impossible, hence the observed bias. In the EPD model, this
bias is manifested in (3), which predicts that, as long as it is undominated, the status
quo option need not be preferred to anything else feasible for it to be maintained.
As already noted, an interesting feature of the EPD model is that this well-known
explanation of status quo bias (which, however, has not been formalized as in (1b)
and (3) before) is very symmetric to the way in which an agent defers or makes a
choice in decision problems with a non-specific status quo. Specifically, in both types
of problems the individual escapes the state of inaction only if the partial dominance
requirement is satisfied by some undominated feasible option (in a general and in a
restricted way in problems with a non-specific and a specific status quo, respectively).
4.2 Related Literature
The first theoretical explanation of status quo bias in a riskless setting was offered
by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) (KT), who attributed its occurrence to reference-
dependent preferences and loss-aversion. Specifically, in one formulation of the KT
model, each alternative x belonged to an n-dimensional attribute space and, whenever
this alternative was the agent’s reference point, it induced a utility function Ux such
that, for every option y, Ux(y) =
∑n
i=1 ui(xi − yi), where ui, i ≤ n, is a strictly
increasing real-valued function such that ui(0) = 0, ui(k) < −ui(−k) for all k 6= 0.
Each ui was assumed to be concave in the domain of attribute value gains and convex
in the domain of losses. The latter two properties capture the agent’s diminishing
sensitivity for gains and losses, respectively, while the former ensures that the agent
is loss averse in the sense that he weighs losses disproportionally more than gains of
equal magnitude. For an agent who maximizes the above reference-dependent utility
function and who is faced with a problem (A, s) where s is also the agent’s reference
point, this specification makes status quo bias likely whenever A includes alternatives
that feature sufficiently many attribute losses relative to s.
The main difference between the KT and the EPD model is that the latter makes
a connection between problems with and without a specific status quo in such a way
that in both types of problems the agent’s behavior is guided by the same reference-
independent, incomplete and acyclic preference relation. Moreover, unlike the KT
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model, EPD also accounts for conflict-induced choice deferral and for the strengthening
of the attraction effect in a deferral-permissive setting. On the other hand, the KT
model allows for the agent’s reference point to be an alternative that is still capable
of influencing choice at a menu despite not being part of it. Although the EPD
model features context-dependent behavior, it does not allow for non-feasible options
to influence choice.
Masatlioglu and Ok (2015) (MO) model status-quo-biased choice in an abstract
framework where the domain is expanded to include problems with or without an
explicit (or, in our terminology, specific) status quo as in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).
In their model, the decision maker is characterized by a utility function U and a
correspondence Q on X that satisfies x ∈ Q(x) for each alternative x. The agent’s
choice correspondence C is such that, for all (A, ), (A, s) ∈ S, C(A, ) = arg max
x∈A
U(x)
and C(A, s) = arg max
x∈A∩Q(s)
U(x), respectively. Whenever he is faced with a problem of
the type (A, s) where s ∈ A is his status quo, Q(s) is interpreted in the MO model as
a psychological constraint set that contains those alternatives that are superior to s.
Unlike the case of problems (A, ) with a non-specific status quo where maximization of
U is unconstrained and the agent is a standard utility maximizer, here U is maximized
over the constraint set A ∩ Q(s). Consequently, whenever this intersection coincides
with {s}, it necessarily follows that C(A, s) = s. However, the latter can also happen
when there is more than one alternative in this intersection, and the utility function
U favours s over those other alternatives. These are the two channels through which
status quo bias can occur in this model.
The main difference between the EPD and MO models is that the latter portrays an
agent who never defers and always chooses in a WARP-consistent way across problems
with a common status quo. As such, it rules out deferral and asymmetric-dominance
choice effects which the EPD model accounts for. Moreover, unlike the EPD procedure,
the MO model assumes that the agent employs two rationales before choosing, i.e. one
that is associated with U and another one that is captured byQ. Yet another difference
is that, under the EPD model, the agent is never “behaviorally indifferent” between
s and some other alternative y ∈ A in the sense that y, s ∈ C(A, s). In this model,
if the agent is unable to compare y and s by strict preference, then when it comes
to choosing between these options, the tie is broken in favor of the status quo. In
contrast, because the function U in the MO model is not generally injective, one has
y, s ∈ C(A, s) whenever y ∈ Q(s) and U(s) = U(y).
At the axiomatic level, despite the differences already mentioned in the previous
section which render the two models logically distinct, the EPD model does in fact
satisfy the third behavioral axiom of the MO model, called Status Quo Irrelevance.
The latter states that, for any (A, s) ∈ S such that C(B, s) 6= s for every B ⊆ A
with |B| > 1 and s ∈ B, and such that C({y, s}, ) = y for some y ∈ A, it holds that
C(A, s) = C(A, ).
With regard to models of conflict-induced choice deferral, Costa-Gomes, Cueva, and
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Gerasimou (2014) proposes and axiomatically characterizes the “maximally dominant”
choice rule whereby an agent who is faced with decision problems with a non-specific
status quo is endowed with an incomplete but transitive weak preference relation and
chooses a most preferred feasible alternative if one exists, and defers otherwise. It is
shown there that such behavior is fully consistent with WARP despite incompleteness
of the agent’s preferences, and that it is also compatible with the choice-overload
phenomenon. Compared to that model, the EPD procedure builds on the expanded
choice domain, and on a strict rather than on a weak preference relation. Moreover,
in addition to deferral which both models capture, EPD also explains status quo bias
and asymmetric-dominance effects.
Dean (2008) also used the expanded domain and analyzed a model of choice with
incomplete weak preferences in which the agent chooses a most preferred alternative
if one exists. If not, he chooses the status quo when no alternative “better” than
it is feasible (where “better” here is captured by a correspondence similar to Q in
Masatlioglu and Ok (2015)), and he chooses a maximizer of the completion of his
preferences otherwise (he does the same in problems with a non-specific status quo
without a most preferred option). This model can account for status quo bias in
large menus in the spirit of the choice overload phenomenon. However, because it
builds on a nonempty-valued choice correspondence and on a completion of the agent’s
preferences, it is not compatible with choice deferral in the sense studied here. Finally,
for a context-dependent axiomatic model of choice and deferral that is developed in a
framework of preference for flexibility and regret aversion over risky objects the reader
is referred to Buturak and Evren (2014).
With regard to recent models of bounded-rational choice that can explain the at-
traction effect, Lombardi (2009), de Clippel and Eliaz (2012), Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella
(2015), Bordallo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) and Gerasimou (2015) are some recent
references. These models are all reviewed in the latter paper. In the case of the first
three models, the choice domain does not include decision problems with a specific
(exogenous) status quo.6 Unlike the EPD model which extends the one in Gerasimou
(2015) in this direction, the choice correspondence in these three models was assumed
to be nonempty-valued, and it is not clear if the resulting choice procedures are robust
with respect to this assumption. The model of salience-distorted, menu-dependent
utility maximization in Bordallo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) is developed in the
very specific domain of price-quality attribute pairs. Although the model does not
allow for introducing a role for a status quo option, the possibility of deferral is cap-
tured there by the presence of the (0, 0)-option. This inclusion, however, does not
lead to the above predictions suggested in Dhar and Simonson (2003) because if the
(0, 0)-option is choosable in a menu with two price-quality conflicting products, it is
also chooosable when a decoy or extreme option is also introduced.
6However, Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella (2015) do analyze a model of choice in which certain feasible alternatives act as
endogenous reference points that influence behavior by restricting the set of options over which the agent is maximizing
his utility function.
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4.3 Remarks on the Modelling of Choice Deferral
The possibility of allowing a choice correspondence to be empty-valued in order to
model deferral that is driven by incompleteness has also been suggested in Hurwicz
(1986), Clark (1995), Kreps (2012) and Costa-Gomes, Cueva, and Gerasimou (2014).
Despite these works, however, there appears to be some resistance in the literature
when it comes to relaxing a choice correspondence in this way. This resistance is likely
due to the argument that, since not choosing is itself a choice, a specific alternative
standing for “no choice” should be included in every menu and the correspondence
should assign this option whenever it is understood that the agent avoids choosing.
In the author’s view, when all choice objects are desirable and avoidance is exclu-
sively due to the agent’s inability to make preference comparisons, modelling deferral
by means of an explicit no-choice option can be misleading. To illustrate, consider
four “real” options w, x, y and z and let also d stand for the explicit no-choice option
(or non-specific status quo). Suppose the individual cannot compare x and y and, as
a consequence, avoids choosing either of them when these are the only available op-
tions. One understands that d is chosen over both x and y here. Suppose also that the
individual prefers x to w and z, and therefore chooses x from the menu that consists
of these three options. In this case x is chosen over d.
Modelled like this, the above behavior should lead one to conclude that the decision
maker is irrational, since her choices violate WARP. Yet, the decision maker is simply
maximizing her preferences in the second menu, and is cautiously avoiding choice in
the absence of a preference comparison in the first menu. Therefore, the conclusion of
irrationality here is presumably too strong. It stems from the fact that the no-choice
option d is treated just like every other alternative, even though when the individual
actually chooses it, he doesn’t do so because it is preferred to the other options, as
would have been the case if avoidance had been caused by unattractiveness. Adopting
the empty-set approach eliminates this problem. With it, the question of whether
behavior is WARP-rational or not is answered by checking for violations of the axiom
that occur only in menus where the individual does choose.
Nevertheless, introducing an explicit and always-feasible no-choice option d is a rea-
sonable modelling method in cases where avoidance is caused by the unattractiveness
of all feasible alternatives. In this case the individual may well be a utility maximizer
who can compare no-choice with all other options, and decide according to whether
it corresponds to the highest achievable utility level or not. For instance, one may
consider having no insurance to be better than having one of policies A, B or C and
hence defer choice on the basis of this undesirability of all available policies and not
because he was unable to choose among them even though all of them were thought to
be better than staying uninsured. When deferral is caused exclusively by all feasible
alternatives being undesirable in this sense, then both this and the empty-set mod-
elling approach can be used to elicit the agent’s preference ordering. However, in both
cases this can be done only up to the desirability threshold.
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Indeed, consider first the approach where each menu A becomes A ∪ {d}. This
implies that every binary menu {x, y} ∈ M becomes {x, y, d} ∈ M∗, where M∗ :=
{A ∪ {d} : A ∈ M}. Let the agent’s preference relation % on X ∪ {d} be defined by
x % d if x ∈ C({x, d}) and x % y if x ∈ C({x, y, d}). Then, for all w, z ∈ X such
that C({w, z, d}) = {d} it is impossible for the agent’s preferences between w and z
to be revealed from choices because he never chooses one of these alternatives in the
presence of the other. Thus, if the agent’s choices are rational, the revealed preference
relation % will be complete and transitive on the set Y ∪ {d}, where Y = {y ∈ X :
y ∈ C({y, d})}. On the other hand, if undesirability-driven deferral is elicited via the
empty-set approach, then Y is defined by Y := {y ∈ X : C({y}) = {y}). The agent’s
preferences between alternatives in Y will then be revealed from choices in binary
menus inM but, again, preferences between alternatives in X \ Y cannot be elicited.
5 Conclusion
The behavioral model of extended partial dominance that was presented above is
the first to provide a unified explanation of choice deferral, status quo bias and the
strengthening of the attraction effect/weakening of the compromise effect that have
been observed when deferral is permissible. Importantly, it provides a clear theoretical
distinction between the former two related but ultimately distinct phenomena. The
model is the first in the literature to portray the decision maker as having a single,
reference-independent, incomplete and acyclic preference relation, which is used in
similar ways across decision problems of the same or of a different type. In both
cases, choices are based on the principle of partial dominance. As such, it suggests
the possibility that a link exists between the behavioural mechanisms underlying the
attraction effect, status quo bias and avoidant behaviour more generally. Finally, the
bounded irrationality of the decision rule described in the model is showcased by
the fact that it actually becomes a utility-maximizing choice rule when the decision
maker’s preferences are complete.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proofs that the axioms are necessary and that the preference relation  in the
EPD model is unique are straightforward and omitted. For sufficiency, define  by
x  y if C({x, y}, ) = x. Suppose x1  x2 . . . xk  x1 for some x1, . . . , xk ∈ X. Let
A := {x1, . . . , xk}. Without loss of generality, consider (A, x1) ∈ S. By assumption,
C(A, x1) 6= ∅. Suppose x1 ∈ C(A, x1). Then, xk  x1 together with A1 implies
C({x1, xk}, x1) = xk, which violates A2. Suppose instead that xj ∈ C(A, x1) for
some j 6= 1. It follows from A1 that xj ∈ C(A, ). But since xj−1  xj holds by
assumption, this also violates A2. Hence, xj 6∈ C(A, x1) for all xj 6= x1. It follows
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then that C(A, x1) = ∅, which is impossible by assumption. Hence,  is acyclic.
Moreover, since all binary problems ({x, y}, ) are included in S,  is unique.
Consider now (A, ) ∈ S and suppose C(A, ) 6= ∅. Let x ∈ C(A, ). From A2,
z  x for all z ∈ A. From A5, x  y for some y ∈ A. Moreover, if x ∈ A is such that
x  y for some y ∈ A and z  x for all z ∈ A, then applying A4 as above leads to
x ∈ C(A, ). It is obvious, finally, that C(A, ) 6= ∅ if C(A, ) is as in (1a). Hence,
(1a) holds.
Next, consider (A, s) ∈ S. Suppose x ∈ C(A, s) for some x 6= s. Assume to
the contrary that there exists y ∈ A such that y  x. It follows from x ∈ C(A, s),
x 6= s and A1 that x ∈ C(A, ). But since y  x, this contradicts A2. Thus,
x ∈ C(A, s) and x 6= s implies y  x for all y ∈ A. Moreover, it follows from A3 that
C({x, s}, s) ⊂ {x, s}. Suppose x = C({x, s}, s). Then, A1 implies x ∈ C({x, s}, ).
From A3, x = C({x, s}, ), or x  s. Conversely, if C(A, s) consists of all x ∈ A such
that y  x for all y ∈ A and x  s, then A2 ensures that C(A, s) 6= s. This establishes
(1b).
For completeness, we will show how the axioms also imply (2) and (3). For the
former, consider (A, ) ∈ S and let x  y and y  x for all x, y ∈ A. Assume, per
contra, that w ∈ C(A, ). From A3, C(A, ) ⊂ A. From A5, C({w, z}, ) = w for
some z ∈ A \ C(A, ). Since w  z by assumption, this is a contradiction. Thus,
C(A, ) = ∅. Conversely, let C(A, ) = ∅. Since  is acyclic, there exists x ∈ A such
that z  x for all z ∈ A. Suppose x  y for some y ∈ A. Let A := {x, y, z1, . . . , zk}.
Then, C({x, y}, ) = x and either x ∈ C({x, zi}, ) or C({x, zi}, ) = ∅ for all i ≤ k.
A4 implies x ∈ C(A, ), a contradiction. This establishes (2).
Finally, to establish (3) suppose (A, s) ∈ S is such that y  s for all y ∈ A and
assume to the contrary that x ∈ C(A, s) for some x 6= s. It follows from above that
x  s, a contradiction. Since C(A, s) 6= ∅, this implies s = C(A, s). Conversely,
suppose C(A, s) = s and let x  s for some x ∈ A. A1 implies C({x, s}, s) = x. A2
then also implies s 6∈ C(A, s), a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof that (b) implies (a) is straightforward and omitted. For the converse,
define the asymmetric relation  on X as in the preceding proof. It follows from A0
and A3 that x  y or y  x for all x, y ∈ X. Hence,  is complete. Suppose x  y,
y  z and x  z. Completeness implies z  x, i.e. C({x, z}, ) = z. By assumption,
({x, y, z}, ) ∈ Z. Moreover, A0 implies C({x, y, z}, ) 6= ∅. If C({x, y, z}, ) = x,
then z  x violates A2. The cases where C({x, y, z}, ) = y and C({x, y, z}, ) = z
are similarly ruled out. Thus, x  z and  is also transitive, hence a strict linear
order. As above,  is unique.
Consider (A, ) ∈ Z. Suppose that C(A, ) = x and let y be the -maximal element
of  in A. Assume to the contrary that x 6= y. Completeness of  implies y  x.
Since C(A, ) = x and y ∈ A by assumption, this violates A2. Thus, x = y.
15
Next, let (A, s) ∈ Z and define x and y as above. Consider the case where y 6= s
first. By way of contradiction, suppose x 6= y. Completeness of  and the definition
of y imply y  x and y  s. Let x 6= s. From A1, x = C(A, s) implies x = C(A, ).
Since y  x and y ∈ A by assumption, x = C(A, ) violates A2. Thus, x = s. In this
case, it follows from A1 and C({x, y}, ) = y that C({s, y}, s) = y. Since y ∈ A and
s = x = C(A, s) by assumption, this violates A2. Thus, x = y.
Consider finally the case where y = s. Suppose x 6= y. From the definition of
y (= s) one has s  x. From the definition of x one also has C(A, s) = x. Since
x 6= s = y, it follows from A1 and x = C(A, s) that x = C(A, ). In view of s  x and
s ∈ A, this violates A2. Thus, x = y and (1) is established for all (A, p) ∈ Z. 
Appendix B: Axiom Independence
Let X = {w, x, y} and let S be the union of the following collections of sets:{
({w}, ), ({x}, ), ({y}, ), ({w, x}, ), ({w, y}, ), ({x, y}, ), ({w, x, y}, )
}
,{
({w}, w), ({w, x}, w), ({w, y}, w), ({w, x, y}, w)
}
,{
({x}, x), ({w, x}, x), ({x, y}, x), ({w, x, y}, x)
}
,{
({y}, y), ({w, y}, y), ({x, y}, y), ({w, x, y}, y),
}
Each of the examples below presents a set of choices that conforms with all but one
of the axioms of Proposition 1. Axiom A1 is broken into A1a and A1b to reflect the
former and the latter condition in the statement of the axiom, respectively.
Not A1a
C({w, x}, ) = C({x, y}, ) = C({w, x, y}, ) = x, C({w, y}, ) = ∅
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = x, C({w, y}, w) = w
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = w, C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y, C({x, y}, y) = x
Not A1b
C({w, x}, ) = ∅, C({w, y}, ) = C({w, x, y}, ) = w, C({x, y}, ) = x
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = w,
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = w, C({x, y}, x) = x
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C({w, y}, y) = C({x, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y
Not A2
C({w, x}, ) = C({w, x, y}, ) = w, C({w, y}, ) = C({x, y}, ) = y
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = w, C({w, y}, w) = y
C({w, x, y}, x) = x, C({w, x}, x) = w, C({x, y}, x) = y
C({w, y}, y) = C({x, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y.
Not A3
C({w, x}, ) = {w, x}, C({w, y}, ) = w, C({x, y}, ) = x, C({w, x, y}, ) = {w, x},
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = w,
C({w, x}, x) = {w, x}, C({x, y}, x) = x, C({w, x, y}, x) = w
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = w, C({x, y}, y) = x
Not A4
C({w, x}, ) = C({w, y}, ) = ∅, C({x, y}, ) = x, C({w, x, y}, ) = ∅,
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = w
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y, C({x, y}, y) = x
Not A5
C({w, x}, ) = C({x, y}, ) = ∅, C({w, x, y}, ) = {w, x}, C({w, y}, ) = w
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = w
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = w, C({x, y}, y) = y
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